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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20001014-CA 
v. : 
DEREK ANDREASON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation 
of § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable David L. Mower, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Was the evidence introduced at trial sufficient to overcome 
defendant's motion to dismiss and support his forgery conviction? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss 
presents a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State v. 
Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^ [10,17 P.3d 1145. "When reviewing a bench trial for 
sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment 
unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the appellate court] otherwise 
reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." American Fork 
City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ^ 4, 12 P.3d 108 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Issue No. 2: Did the prosecutor's argument on the evidentiary inferences amount 
to prosecutorial misconduct? 
Standard of Review: "In determining whether a given statement constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the 
evidence presented at trial." State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
Issue No. 3: Were the trial court's findings sufficient to support defendant's 
forgery conviction? 
Standard of Review: "The ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's 
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to 
provide a basis for decision." State v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993,995 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quotations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged by information with three counts of forgery, 
each third degree felonies, one count of racketeering, a second degree felony, and on 
count of unlicenced practice of architecture, a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-3. Later, the 
State voluntarily dismissed the racketeering and unlicenced practice of architecture 
charges. R. T2:ll ,73. 
A bench trial was held before Judge David L. Mower. R. T2, T3. At trial, the 
court granted defendant's motion to consolidate the three forgery charges and denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss. R. T2:74-101. After considering the evidence, the court 
convicted defendant of one count of forgery. R. T3:267-68. 
Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of one 
to fifteen years, and fined $9,625.00. R. 196-98,201-02. However, the court suspended 
all but $1,500.00 of the fine upon defendant's completion of eighteen months probation 
and sixteen days in jail. Id. The court also granted defendant's motion to stay the 
execution of judgment. Id. Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R. 203-05. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
In April 1998, seeking a county building permit, defendant appeared at the office 
of John Hicks, Sevier County Building Official, and submitted a set of twenty-year-old 
building plans for a four-plex apartment unit. R. T2:19-20, 27; Exhibit 2. Hicks 
examined the plans and determined that they must be rejected. R. T2:20. Hicks 
explained to defendant both in person and over the telephone, that the plans could not be 
used because they were "too old" and the "codes had changed over 20 years." R. T2:20, 
32-33. Hicks told defendant that the plans needed to be upgraded by an architect or 
engineer. R. T2:20. On April 16, 1998, Hicks followed-up his conversation with 
defendant by sending defendant a letter outlining the reasons for rejecting the plans. R. 
T2:32-33;Exhibit 3 at Addendum B. That letter stated: 
I have reviewed the plans you submitted for a four [sic] plex. These plans 
are 20 years [sic] and the engineer[']s stamp is not legible. 
Building codes and standards have changed dramatically over a period of 20 
years. These plans must be reviewed and re-stamped by a Licensed 
Architect or engineer prior to approval by the Seiver County Building 
Department. 
Id. 
In response, defendant retrieved the plans from Hicks, but returned nearly two 
weeks later with a clearer set of plans containing a legible architect's seal on the lower 
!The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See 
Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,12, 975 P.2d 501. 
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right-hand corner. R. T2:20, 22, 23-25; Exhibit l.2 Upon receipt of the plans, Hicks 
immediately noticed that the architect's seal had not been properly "wet-stamped," in that 
the architect, John Rowley, had not signed over the top of his seal. R. T2:20-21. When 
Hicks notified defendant of the problem, defendant could not explain why the seal had 
not been wet stamped. R. T2:20-21; T3:230-32. Hicks then telephoned the Rowley 
residence to resolve the problem. R. T2:21-22. Josephine Rowley answered Hicks' call 
and explained that her husband had died two years earlier, in 1996. R. T2:22, 36-38. 
Later, defendant returned to retrieve the second set of plans. R. T2:21. Although 
defendant wanted both copies of the second set of plans, Hicks gave him only one copy 
and delivered the other copy to the Utah Department of Professional Licensing for 
investigation. Id. Further investigation of the second set of plans revealed that the 
signature of the engineer, Allen K. Nielson, was not authentic. R. T2:56-65. 
Upon rejection of the second set of plans, defendant took the plans to Stephen D. 
Cohen, a structural engineer. R. T3:190-91, 201-02. Cohen reviewed the second set of 
plans, removed the letterheads, made various upgrades pursuant to the current building 
code changes, sealed, and wet-signed the plans. R. T3:201-02; Exhibit 33. Defendant 
paid Cohen for his services. R. T3:202. Eventually, those plans were approved by the 
2
 At trial, neither defendant nor Hicks could remember if the second set of plans 
were personally delivered by defendant or if they were left at Hicks' office by one of 
defendant's employees. R. T2:26, 31; T3:175-76,197-98. Nonetheless, defendant 
acknowledged tendering or uttering the second set of plans to Hicks. R. T3:75-76. 
5 
County. R. T3:191; Exhibit 38. 
At trial, Hicks testified that he expressly told defendant that the first set of plans 
needed to be upgraded or redrawn by the architect to reflect the changes in the current 
code. R. T2:20, 29-33. Hicks also indicated that defendant was aware that the second set 
of plans were "supposed to have been redrawn by the architect to make the code 
changes." Id. 
At trial, defendant testified that in 1978 he contracted with Rowley to design and 
construct three four-plex apartment buildings. R.T3:160-65,180-81. Under the terms of 
the contract, Rowley was to provide design services for "3 units only.'5 See Exhibit 5, p. 1, 
6 at Addendum C. In addition, defendant agreed that Rowley was to review the 
construction documents for compliance with the minimum building code requirements, 
R. T3:164; Exhibit 5, p. 7 at Addendum C. 
Defendant claimed that the second set of plans he gave to Hicks were copied from 
an original which defendant had drawn in 1974, but which Rowley had altered in 1978. 
R. T3:177-78. After contracting with Rowley in 1978, defendant claimed he gave his 
drawings to Rowley, and Rowley cut and taped the plans to his border, sealed the plans, 
and then returned them to defendant. R. T3:177-78; Exhibit 23. In April 1999, defendant 
attempted to convince Josephine Rowley to confirm his story. R. T2:52-53. Defendant 
asked Ms. Rowley to sign a letter verifying that her husband had cut and taped the plans 
together. Id. However, Ms. Rowley refused to sign the letter because she was certain that 
6 
lici husband It.tcl n ,vi ai! and taped the plans together. R T2:52-54. 
On cross examination, defendant was questioned about submitting an ippiu w\u n 
to renew his electrical contracts .; • i luine "-1 n m.istn electrician who died 
two years eailie efendant denied that event, claiming that he 
litiil in i kiio '*-. v • iu. Eventually, however, defendant admitted that the accusation 
w a s | m e j an (j that it occurred in 1095. R. T3:226-28. 
ARG(IMI*IM > MHMIM \u\ 
POIiN i i: Deh- - ^ vidence offered at trial was insufficient to 
c '• .<- dismiss and to support his forgery conviction. This claim imk 
because the State offered sufficient evidence to form a prima iacic u^ i again*! deUindrin1, 
and the clear weight of the evidence ottered it* hi^l .MjiyrHts defendant's conviction. 
The most Idling evidence presented during the State's case was John Hicks' letter 
to deferidanl, v,'(iteh clearly informed defendant that the* first set of plans. Gaiwv* *,^* . . , 
20, x97H, were outdated due to changes in the buildup , *,u - •, 
an i needed to be "reviewed and re-stampt • r' I r etil *• ^ itcvt or ercmeei. i;w~r™ 
the language appeared two weeks later with a copy of the first set 
nf plans containing Rowley's clear seal, representing to the county thai the plans kid k i n 
reviewed and re-sealed by the original aichited it wr HM-II discovered 111-1I Kuwleyhad 
died two years earlier. 
Based 11 lose events and additional evidence offered at trial, the clear weight of 
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the evidence sufficiently shows that defendant uttered the plans to Hicks with the intent to 
defraud the County, Rowley, and the public, and that defendant knew he was facilitating a 
fraud. 
POINT II: Defendant next claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by allegedly arguing facts not in evidence. Defendant points primarily to the 
prosecutor's claim that defendant orally represented to Hicks that the second set of plans 
had been properly reviewed and re-sealed by an architect. Such argument constitutes a 
reasonable inference based on facts offered into evidence, which the prosecutor was 
entitled to argue to the trier of fact. Therefore, the prosecutor was acting well within his 
discretion. 
Additionally, because on rebuttal defendant voiced his disagreement with the 
prosecutor's assessment of the evidence, he cannot show that the trial judge was unaware 
of the discrepancy. Thus defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's arguments. 
POINT III: Defendant also claims that the trial court's factual findings were 
inadequate. However, the court's dialogue with defense counsel during closing argument, 
and the court's oral findings offered in conjunction with its decision were sufficiently 
comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for defendant's conviction. 
Specifically, the court found that defendant uttered the second set of plans to Hicks, 
misrepresented to the County that the plans had been properly reviewed and re-sealed by 
8 
ii i .111 Infect, i n t e n d e d to d e f r a u d t h e C o u n t y by o f fe r ing t h e s e c o n d <?et o f p l a n s . a.«.: ^ . / 
diat he was facilitating a fraud through his actions. 1 hu . • ?u. 
POINT I3 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL, INCLUDING ALL 
REASONABLE EVIDENTIARY INFERENCES, WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S C O F T r ' ^ ^ F O R FORGERY 
On appea. * nee adduced at trial was insufficient to 
*' >ic duubt that he committed forgery. Br. of Aplt at 10-31 
u^i^nuaixv ,» insufficiency claim is twofold; (1) defenda* 1 ihe Stale's evuli/na; 
v MI si insufficient to overcome his mo»» , i his motion to 
d : v\as tmpiopci ly d^ui^l, i\\\\\ i,') JrtVndaiit claims that all the evidence offered at 
trial n 't\ inefficient to sustain his conviction. 7r * ~ ~ Hani's claims lack m 
During trial, the State presented evidence from Alan IN;ci5o;. . .: .* 
testified that his signature on defendaiil '\ plans v • . Rt 12:122-50. On 
appeal, dei • -' - ' led to show that he intended to defraud Niclson 
beciitisc he had no knowledge of Nielson's false signature, Br. of Aplt. at 13, J 9-20, 24 • 
31. However, because the trial court based it i uling on the fact lh;il ik lendanl inlrmh ii (e 
foints i, n, ana m of defendant - >rief all address defendant's insufficiency of 
tb evidence claim. Br. of Apli :<' . Accordingly, the State's response to those 
section" \* embodied in Pom: I be' 
>LH
 4S*u/t .-..v. , -; ; ._* I "r»9V) (affirming trial court's 
dtVi^K • on ah *-: -.- • . . . 
9 
defraud Sevier County and the public, or had knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud, 
the State will not address whether defendant intended to defraud or knew that he was 
facilitating a fraud against Nielson. 
A. Because the State offered sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of 
the forgery statute, defendant's motion to dismiss was correctly denied. 
At the end of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the charges. R. T2:89-
97. Defendant claimed that the State did not show the requisite intent to defraud. R. 
T2:92-97. The trial court listened to argument from both counsel and considered the 
evidence presented by the State including reasonable inferences. R. T2:89-101. The 
court found that the State had at least made a prima facie case for forgery, and denied 
defendant's motion. R. T2:100-01. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion. Br. of Aplt. at 10-20. Given the evidence offered by the State and all 
reasonable inferences, defendant's claim fails. 
A defendant's motion to dismiss "requires the trial court to determine whether the 
defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense." State v. Noren, 
704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (per curium). To survive a motion to dismiss based upon 
a sufficiency challenge, there must be some evidence, including all reasonable inferences, 
which support the elements of the charged crime. State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). Therefore, "[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss 
presents a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State v. 
Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, TflO, 17 P.3d 1145. 
10 
Defendant was charged with forgeu , ,* ti;.; j * _ - K - Itah 
Code Ann § 76-<>-MH i IVWI I < ?<i ' : 'Z'n'1^- " t forgery it, v-_:L 
purpo ' I iirnnih m with knowledge that he is faciliuilinj: a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he . . . —- utters any writing so that the writing 01 u • 
making utterance purports to be the ac< - ... 
501(7^ fl ^/4- vordmgly, l«- MII I, iv „i HIM **uss the State must show be>o •*« a 
rtu.) «> JI lii.il defendant uttered a writing purporting to be the act of another, 
"; that defendant either (a) acted with the intent to dciiaud anyone, t : 
he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyi'iu "'"""' I In- (,^ »i1c HCM-iiled sufficient 
credible evidence on each dement . 
(1) Ut te r ing of a writing purported to be the act of another. 
Section 76-6-501(1) requires that an individual utter a writing pi..; -i\ - , 
act of another. See Utah Code Ann. fc lb b ")t< [ i > l'l ' i * « n i »| I i - \ sLiiied that 
delcndant deiiviucu UH: scaimf srl o1 r im, \ Kxhibit ] \ to his office. See R. 12:20, 22, 
2 3 • l *), h\hibi ( I 11 ic State also elicited testimony from Ms. Rowley, identifying her 
husband's seal on the second set of plans (Exhibi 
trial court, defendant did iiui vinaiieng i "t *•*: to uw the ^i j f 
an^Mier R 'I,! Kl> I I 11« f»i i , <l"is '• ~vnt of the statute is satisfied, See Utah Cede 
/Viin $7f>.rv.<01(l)(1999). 
11 
(2) Intent to defraud or knowledge of facilitating a fraud. 
To prove forgery under section 76-6-501, the State must also show either that the 
individual acted with either intent to defraud or knowledge that he was facilitating a 
fraud. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501(1) (1999). In State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 
1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court paralleled the terms "purpose to defraud" and 
"intent to defraud," defining them as "simply a purpose to use a false writing as if it were 
genuine in order to gain some advantage^ Id. (quotations omitted and emphasis added) 
(citing State v. May, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (Idaho 1969)). Knowledge or intent may 
generally be inferred from an individual's conduct viewed in light of all the 
accompanying circumstances. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App. 289,1fl0, 988 P.2d 949. 
Therefore, to prove intent to defraud or knowledge of facilitating a fraud, the State need 
only offer "some facts or circumstances from which an inference can logically be drawn 
before the defendant can be required to mount a defense and prove his lack of knowledge 
or intent." Id. Further, "[b]ecause of the difficulty of proving knowledge and intent in a 
prosecution for forgery, the quantum of evidence the State must produce before an 
inference of knowledge or intent will arise should not be unrealistically burdensome." Id. 
Here, the most important evidence presented during the State's case was the 
substance of Hicks' conversation and letter to defendant. See R. T2:20, 32-33; Exhibit 3 
at Addendum B. Through those communications, Hicks distinctly informed defendant 
that the first set of plans (Exhibit 2) needed to be upgraded by either an architect or an 
12 
• i tu ieilect changes in the current building codes, See id, 1 he second parae* 
of Hicks'letter states: 
Building codes and standards have changed dramatically over* a period oi 20 
years. These plans must be reviewed and re-stamped by a Licensed 
Architect or engineer prior to approval by the Sevier County Building 
Department. 
3 at Addendum B ' 3 State prove-1 that ex tendant 
*r copy of the same plans ne«., i* ... : • <^ bxinbii L 
i an . • .u , -c\ whobc name and seal appcai ^i ill 
plans, was deceased and could not have "reviewed and re-stamped" the second set of 
plans (Exhibit 1). See R 12:22, 36-38. 
Defendant's intent to dullaud Suviui < «» n i H In mli m il fmrn his actions. See 
KM rum • i \|-i ,', ' 111 i, v . iho State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 
( intent to defraud may reluL M A counts ~« ^ *•- M t's presentation ot the 
second set of plans in effect represented to Hicks »* ~» • •* p.ai. * :.«J r i 
re-stamped"by an. architect consiste..: 
iiihiiidnl In g*i„i iL" nJ\ .itil.ir .rl ,i i'-iiiltlinr" permit without making the necessary 
. code revisions and incurring extra expense St r Sf^tc v Gonzalez, 822 I1 JYl 
il i, *:r OJtahCt App 190i\ 
Similai <* otvau^ -:.. * rhe upgrade requirement 
MH be reasonably inferred that defendant, an 
** nenced contractor of nearl> 3u years, knew ihat . pon receipt of a building perirm his 
13 
construction could yield a deficient or potentially dangerous result. See R. T3:157-58. 
Defendant knew that he would save money on construction of the four-plex under the out-
dated plans, while giving an unsuspecting member of the public the impression that the 
edifice was new, safe, and in compliance with current building codes. See Kihlstrom, 
1999 UT App. 289, flO. See also Winward, 909 P.2d at 912 (under section 76-6-501(1), 
"it is sufficient for the State to show that a defendant's actions were designed to defraud 
the public"). Thus, when defendant represented to Hicks that the second set of plans had 
been "reviewed and re-stamped" by an architect, defendant exhibited both an intent to 
defraud the County and a knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud on the public. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). 
In sum, the State presented a prima facie case that defendant committed forgery, 
and the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss at the end of the States 
case. 
B. The clear weight of the evidence offered at trial supports defendant's 
forgery conviction* 
Defendant next contends that the overall evidence offered at trial was insufficient 
to support his forgery conviction, hence, the trial court's decision was allegedly against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 21-31. Defendant's claim is refuted 
above, based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief. 
Nothing in defendant's case refuted the State's evidence. Indeed, a review of the entire 
trial reveals that the evidence was more than sufficient to support defendant's conviction. 
14 
"When reviewing a bench tiial for sufficiency ot U\L c >..;.... | 
must sustain the trial court's juagment un. JL UK, 
evidence, or n (tin 'ippcliaii1< OHM f oihmvise reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that 
j! mis'hke 1ms been made." American Fork City v, Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ^ [4, 11 P..id 
108 (citing Spanish Fork City v\ Bryan, 1Q09UTApp(»l 1 « li^j I'.id >' 11 iL |i> .1 ill.., 
omitted) T ~thc~^vords, an appellate comi •Ticient competent 
evidence »ui x..-. \ h> enable the trier of fact lo Jricrmine, beyond 
• i iM'^ ii ifiable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. State v, Lyman, 966 P.2d 
2/8,282 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
As stated, to survive a sufficiency t lulluigc, ihr "vidi'nrr offered at trial must 
c
 •. i", J^OILII'I" ill i|n I What defendant made or uttered a writing purporting 
t* vt of another, and (2) that defendant either (a) acted with the intent to delraud 
anyc—, ui (b) knew that he was facilitating a ts.iuv, »w u
 rv.;p_. 
Code Ann. § 7^ A * " * ihc lolloping 
evidciiir offered it fn:il \\Uw < oiilmns defendant's conviction. 
(1) Uttering of a writing purported to be the act of another. 
Defendant admitted at trial that, following I hck ,^ ..,.• - * -
he had copies ul the original p) n^ "H.HII.' :HI<I ihvn prese * *;* - opica io ilick& ii^~:l) 
lull i I' I "! I/1' Vii Exhibits 1,2,23. Further, during closing argument, 
defense counsel conceded that the second set of plans constituted a "writing" as do tin \\ 
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by section 76-6-501, and that defendant uttered those plans to Hicks. R. T3:264-66. 
Defendant's admissions affirmatively established that he uttered a writing purported to be 
the act of another. 
(2) Intent to defraud or knowledge of facilitating a fraud. 
During his own presentation of evidence, defendant's intent to defraud both 
Rowley and the public, and defendant's knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud, 
became more apparent. At trial, defendant testified that he paid Rowley for his services 
in 1979. R. T3:160-65,180-81. Those services included reviewing the construction 
documents for compliance with the then-existing minimum building code requirements. 
R. T3:180-82; Exhibit 5, p. 7 at Addendum C. Additionally, under the terms of their 
contract, Rowley was to provide design services for "3 units only." See Exhibit 5, p. 1,6 
at Addendum C. While defendant discussed building a fourth unit with Rowley, this 
idea never came to fruition. R. T3:179-80. Accordingly, Rowley was paid for his services 
on three edifices. R. T3:181-82; Exhibit 5, p. 6 at Addendum C. Because their contract 
excluded any work on other projects, defendant would have been required to pay Rowley 
additional money for revision of the first set of plans. See Exhibit 5, p. 6. 
In fact, after his second set of plans were rejected by Hicks, defendant took the plans to 
Stephen Cohen, a structural engineer, who charged defendant to review, revise, and re-
seal the plans. R. T3:190-91,201-02; Exhibit 33. Accordingly, defendant's 
representation to the County that the second set of plans had been "reviewed and re-
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stamped" by Rowley, makes clear his intent to defraud the architect. 
More imports1 M o i d v i i u ^ . 
u ,„i. ' ,Kls iiiU Ins knowledge he was> 
liifiliiiidiig that fraud. See Winward, 909 P.2d at 912, An examination of Cohen's 
anvmuons reveals changes made in the interest of publu. flirty Act" hxJiibn U \ kn f 
necessary and arguably more cost; * ... .., . • . • increase in the 
• "' - • - • the concrete steps in the building's main 
defendant admitted to knowing that the building codes had changed 
ove* ihe :ast twen;\ vears. F T3:209-10. Clearly, uu^ -^ant was attempting lu M\\ C 
money by compromising public health and siilcly. 
C
 ocj w^ ^ e pjajn iangUage of Hicks' letter, 
d • ; - fnlteied. See R. 13.20? -09. lie acknowledged receiving Hicks' letter, but 
claimed that he was under the impression that Hicks wantcu v,m, *i wiwj. _.* . . 
plans. Tic?. When asked w hj he .^^
 ; •• ' peciiieally 
reqiiiicJ iliai (In litsl .il uf nl imi hv "lovirwed and re-stamped," defendant offered no 
reasonable explanation. See id. See also State v. Broun, 048 P.2d 566, 560 (T .: 
(circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to suppot, . ,.•::.... 
exchange evinces defendant's cleai know ledge Ii ; * . * * ~'diis were to haw 
f :, "uhitect or engineer. 
Additionally, based on defendant's initial lack of candor when questioned about 
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submitting an application five years earlier to renew his electrical contractor's license 
using the name of a deceased master electrician, the court may have determined that 
defendant was untruthful. R. T3:212-15. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994) ("Clearly, the fact finder is in the 
best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and is free to disbelieve their 
testimony/') (quotations omitted). At first, defendant denied having any knowledge of 
that event. R. T3:212-15. Eventually, however, defendant admitted that the accusation 
was true. R. T3:226-28. Accordingly, the trial court had a reason to disbelieve 
defendant's story that he had inadvertently disregarded the second paragraph of Hicks' 
letter. 
Given the clear weight of the evidence, the trial court correctly denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss and convicted defendant of forgery. 
POINT II5 
THE PROSECUTOR'S ARGUMENTS WERE 
SUFFICIENTLY FOUNDED ON FACTS ADDUCED AT 
TRIAL AND CONSTITUTED REASONABLE 
INFERENCES; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM FAILS 
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct 
by arguing facts not in evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 31-39. Specifically, defendant points to 
various statements made by the prosecutor during his opening remarks, in his response to 
5Point II responds to Point IV of defendant's brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 31-39. 
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defendant's motion to dismiss, and during closing argument. Id. Each of those 
statements concern communications between defendant and Hicks regarding defendant's 
submission of the second set of plans. See R. T2:89-101; T3:234-67. Essentially, the 
prosecutor claimed that when defendant gave Hicks the second set of plans, defendant 
represented either through his actions or orally, that the plans had been upgraded to 
conform with the current building codes by a licenced architect. See R. T2:97; T3:234-
35,259-61. 
Defendant's claim fails on two grounds: (1) in general, a prosecutor's statements 
made in opening argument are not considered to be evidence, and (2) the prosecutor's 
other statements made in response to defendant's motion to dismiss and in closing 
argument are supported by record facts, and therefore constitute reasonable, and 
permissible, evidentiary inferences. 
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where (a) the remarks of the prosecutor call 
attention to a matter that the trier of fact would not justified in considering when 
determining his verdict; and, if so, (b) under the circumstances of the particular case, 
whether the error is substantial or prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result. State v. Longshaw, 
961 P.2d 925,928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
A. The prosecutor's statements during opening argument are not 
evidentiary. 
Before the opening statements, the trial judge asked the prosecutor to "tell [him] 
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about the accusations that are now outstanding [sic] that are going to be brought into issue 
today." R. T2:11. In response the prosecutor named the charges against defendant and 
then began his opening statement. R. T2:l 1-12. Defendant alleges that the following 
statements made by the prosecutor during his opening statement are improper: 
Approximately two weeks later, the first part of May, the defendant 
returned with a set of plans, gave them to the building inspector, Mr. Hicks. 
Mr. Hicks looked at the plans, asked him if he had returned them to the 
architect and had them reviewed and updated. The defendant indicated that 
he had. 
From examining the documents, Mr. Hicks observed that the seal 
from the architect was now readily readable. It had not been so on the 
earlier set presented at the prior time. He asked if they had been returned. 
The defendant indicated they had, they'd been reviewed by the architect, 
and that they're now in conformity, in compliance. 
R.T2:12-13. 
Utah courts have long recognized that statements made during opening argument 
are not evidence. See State v. Hall, 186 P,2d 970, 972 (Utah 1947). Furthermore, rule 
17(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the "prosecuting attorney may 
make an opening statement... [then] [t]he prosecution shall offer evidence in support of 
the charge." Utah R. Cr. P. 17(g) (emphasis added). Clearly, the above comments are 
proper as an outline of the evidence to be proffered during the evidentiary phase of the 
trial. See id. Because this case was tried before a judge, presumably the trial court is 
well aware that opening statements are not evidentiary. 
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B. The prosecutor's arguments are supported by record facts and 
reasonable inferences. 
Defendant also challenges various arguments made by the prosecutor during his 
response to defendant's motion to dismiss and in his closing argument. See Br. of Aplt. at 
31-39. In particular, defendant complains that the prosecutor's statements that defendant 
orally represented to Hicks that the second set of plans had been reviewed by an architect, 
misstated the evidence. Id. 
A prosecutor is accorded broad latitude in arguing his or her theory of the case to 
the trier of fact. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ 61, 979 P.2d 799. Further, "[wjhile 
encouraging [the trier of fact] to consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial 
misconduct... the prosecutor may fully discuss with the [trier of fact] reasonable 
inferences and deductions drawn from the evidence[.]" Id. at ^ 59. 
The record reveals the facts upon which the prosecutor's statements were based. 
At trial, Hicks testified that upon receipt of the first set of plans from defendant, he 
telephoned defendant. R. T2:20. Hicks informed defendant that the building codes had 
changed and that he needed to have the plans upgraded by an architect or engineer. Id. 
Hicks then included that same information in a letter to defendant. R. T2:32-33; Exhibit 
3 at Addendum B. Two weeks later, defendant presented Hicks with the second set of 
plans. R. T2:20. Hicks noticed that the plans had not been properly wet-signed and asked 
defendant why the architect had not done so. R. T2:20-21. Defendant claimed to not 
know the answer. R. T2:21. 
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Given the fact that defendant twice received clear notice from Hicks that the first 
set of plans had to be upgraded by an architect, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to 
infer that defendant had intentionally represented the second set of plans as an upgraded 
version, either orally or by his conduct. Because the prosecutor acted well within his 
discretion in arguing that inference, defendant cannot show that the prosecutor improperly 
called attention to a matter that the trial judge would not have been justified in 
considering when determining his verdict. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 59; Longshaw, 
961 P.2dat928. Therefore, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Id.6 
Notwithstanding the fact that at trial Hicks did not expressly state that defendant 
orally told him the second set of plans had been reviewed and re-sealed by an architect, 
Hicks did offer that testimony at the preliminary hearing: 
PROSECUTOR: What did [defendant] tell you with regard to the 
involvement of Mr. Rowley in the second set of plans? 
HICKS: I asked [defendant] when I first saw him - well, it [sic] 
immediately got the red flag, because the seal had not 
been what we call a wet stamp. It hadn't been signed 
in ink over the seal. Therefore, it looked to me like it 
was a copy. 
So I told [defendant] - 1 asked him at that point if he 
had actually sent these back to the architect or 
engineer, whichever it was. He said, "Yes." That's 
when I said, "Well, why didn't [the architect] sign the 
stamp?" 
R.Tl:44-45. 
Although defendant's statements during this conversation between defendant and 
Hicks were not specifically elicited from Hicks at trial, this evidence was placed before 
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C. Because defendant expressly rebutted the prosecutor's characterization 
of the evidence, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced. 
To prove prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must also show that, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, he suffered prejudice as a result of the prosecutor's 
actions. See Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 928. Here, defendant expressly rebutted the 
prosecution's characterization of the evidence after the prosecutor's arguments were 
made. See R. T2:97-100; T3:249-50,253-57. Thus, defendant effectively notified the 
trial judge of the alleged discrepancy. Accordingly, he cannot show that the trial court 
incorrectly relied any material not in evidence when making his decision. 
POINT III7 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE 
SUFFICIENTLY COMPREHENSIVE AND 
PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES TO PROVIDE A BASIS 
FOR DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Defendant also claims that the trial court's finding were deficient. Br. of Aplt. at 
39-40. While defendant acknowledges that the court did issue "some statements which 
could be considered findings[,]" defendant complains that the those findings were not 
specifically detailed as to each element of the forgery statute. Id. Defendant's claim fails 
the trial judge, Judge Mower, through defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover. See R. 
72A, 72B, 72C. After the preliminary hearing, defendant moved to quash his bindover 
and included a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript as an exhibit to his 
memorandum in support of his motion. See id. The preliminary hearing was held before 
Judge Kay L. Mclff, who subsequently recused himself from this case. R. 32; Tl. 
7Point III responds to Point V of defendant's brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 39-40. 
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because the court's oral findings were sufficient to provide a basis for defendant's 
conviction. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires findings of facts in all actions 
tried without a jury. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).8 These findings may be expressed orally 
following the close of evidence . Id. "The ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's 
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to 
provide a basis for decision." State v. Magee, 837 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quotations omitted). 
Prior to issuing its findings, the court questioned defense counsel with respect to 
the various elements of the forgery charge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, I also need to look at 76-6-501 and compare it 
to the evidence that we've got here, and look at the verbs that are in 76-6-
501. Let's go to subsection (2) and look at the definition of "writing." 
Does Exhibit No. 1 qualify as a writing, Mr. McCandless? Subs (A), (B), 
and (C) are only examples. The definition is in subsection (2), any method 
of recording valuable information. 
MR. McCANDLESS: I think this is a broad definition. 
THE COURT: Pretty broad, isn't it? So it probably gets Exhibit 1 included 
as a writing. 
MR. McCANDLESS: Yeah, I think we probably do. 
THE COURT: So lets's go to subsection (1) and look at the verbs that are 
8Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is applicable to criminal bench trials. 
See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, n.2 (Utah 1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). 
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there. "Alters" or "utters." . . . If we go to subsection (B), we get a whole 
bunch of verbs there. Does an affirmative declaration by Mr. Andreason of 
either taking Exhibit 1 into the County building and laying it on the desk, or 
even saying words, [sic] Is that enough to fit any of those verbs that are in 
sub (b)? 
MR. McCANDLESS:... I think it would more clearly - - more easily fit 
under an uttering. 
THE COURT: Okay. So he walks into the County building with two sets of 
Exhibit No. 1, and they leave his hands and end up on the desk. That's an 
utterance. 
R. T3:264-66. This dialogue evinces the court's determination that pursuant to the 
forgery statute, the second set of plans were a writing purporting to be the act of another 
and that defendant uttered those plans to the County. See id. The court then addressed 
the remaining issue-whether defendant possessed the intent to defraud or knowledge that 
he was facilitating a fraud-in its findings: 
THE COURT: I'm prepared to make a decision in this case, [sic] 
Appreciate what you've shown me by presenting the evidence and pointing 
things out to me. It's an interesting case. 
The facts have shown me, convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Andreason committed a forgery because he uttered Exhibit No. 1 to 
Sevier County, and he intended that the utterance to be - - to have been 
executed at a time and place other than in fact was the case. The reason I 
reach that conclusion is because Exhibit No. 1 [the second set of plans] can 
only be interpreted in light of Exhibit No. 3, Mr. Andreason's actions taken 
in response to No. 3. 
R. T3:267-68. Exhibit 3, referred to by the court, is the letter written by Hicks to 
defendant informing him that the first set of plans must be reviewed and re-sealed by an 
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architect prior to approval. See Exhibit 3 at Addendum B. The court's findings are 
sufficient to indicate that its conviction is based upon defendant's intent to defraud Sevier 
County and his knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud. See R. T3:267-68. The 
court's reasoning is based upon its inference from the evidence that defendant was aware 
that the first set of plans needed to be reviewed and re-stamped by an architect prior to 
approval, and his presentation of the second set of plans containing a clearer architect's 
seal without obtaining the required review. See R. T3:267-68; American Fork City v. 
Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, ffl[9-10,12 P.3d 108 (a trial judge may reasonably make 
conclusions based upon evidentiary inferences). Cf. State v. Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71, 
f 14, 21 P.3d 1139 ("A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences 
that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.") (citations and 
quotations omitted). Accordingly, the court's findings are sufficiently comprehensive and 
pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for its decision. See Magee, 837 P.2d at 995. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction for forgery. 




Assistant Attorney General 
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JT S 76-6-501 UT-ST-ANN 
:.A. 1953 § 76-6-501 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 5. FRAUD 
Copyright @ 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
5-501 Forgery --"Writing" defined. 
J A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
/ledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such 
>red writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, 
itters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
lentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be 
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or 
)orts to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence 
>r than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such 
jinal existed. 
>) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage 
;ransmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
ns such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, 
any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by 
Dvernment or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
resenting an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
:>r claim against any person or enterprise. 
J) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
)IT 
:ory: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 
§ 19; 1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 15; 1996, ch. 205, § 27. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Sevier County Building Department 
Building Official County Courthouse (801) 896-9262 Ext. 220 
John L. Hicks 250 North Main Fax (8010 896-8888 
P.O. Box 517 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
A p r i l 16 , 1998 
D & D Contracting 
425 South State 
Salina, Utah 84654 
Dear D & D: 
I have reviewed the plans you submitted for a four plex. These 
plans are 20 years and the engineers stamp is not legible. 
Building codes and standards have changed dramatically over a 
period of 20 years. These plans must be reviewed and re-stamped by 
a Licensed Architect or engineer prior to approval by the Sevier 
County Building Department. 
Thank You for your attention to this matter. 




cc: Salina City Planning Commission 
Mr. Paul Lyman / Salina City Attorney 
ADDENDUM C 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS 
AIA Document B1S1 
Abbreviated Form of Agreement Between 
Owner and Architect 
For Construction Projects of Limited Scope 
1978 EDITION 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH 
AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR MOD!HCATiON 
AGREEMENT 
made as of the 30th daY°f October 
Hundred and Seventy Eight 
BETWEEN the Owner: Derek & Dana Andreason 
355 Sandy Lane 
Salina , Utah 
and the Architect:
 J o h n s> Rowley, A. I .A. 
8 N. 200 W. 
Cedar City, Utah 
For the following Project: 
(Includes detailed description of Project location and scope.) 
D & D Development Apartment Village Four-Plex 
Salina , Utah 
The Owner and the Architect agree as set forth below. 
Copyright 1974, © 1978 by The American Institute of Architects, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C 20006. 
Reproduction of the material herein or substantial quotation of its provisions without permission of the AIA violates 
the copyright laws of the United States and wil l be subject to legal prosecution. 
AIA DOCUMENT B1S1 • ABBREVIATED OWNER-ARCHITECT ACREEMENT • JUNE 1978 EDITION • AIA« 
<a w » . THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C 20006 B151-1978 1 
in the year of Nineteen 
On old State Street 




The Architect's Basic Services are as described un-
der the four Phases identified below and in Article 
10, and unless otherwise provided in Article 10, 
include normal structural, mechanical and electri-
cal engineering services, 
1.1 DESIGN PHASE 
1.1.1 The Architect shall review with the Owner alterna-
tive approaches to design and construction of the Project. 
1.1.2 Based on the mutually accepted program and Proj-
ect budget requirements, the Architect shall prepare, for 
approval by the Owner, Design Documents consisting of 
drawings and other documents appropriate for the Proj-
ect, and shall submit to the Owner a Statement of Proba-
ble Construction Cost. 
1.2 CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS PHASE 
1.2.1 Based on the approved Design Documents, the Ar-
chitect shall prepare, for approval by the Owner, Con-
struction Documents consisting of Drawings and Specifi-
cations setting forth in detail the requirements for the 
construction of the Project and shall advise the Owner 
of any adjustments to previous Statements of Probable 
Construction Cost. 
1.2.2 The Architect shall assist the Owner in connection 
with the Owner's responsibility for filing documents re-
quired for the approval of governmental authorities hav-
ing jurisdiction over the Project. 
1.3 BIDDING OR NEGOTIATION PHASE 
1.3.1 Unless provided in Article 10, the Architect, fol-
lowing the Owner's approval of the Construction Docu-
ments and of the most recent Statement of Probable Con-
struction Cost, shall assist the Owner in obtaining bids or 
negotiated proposals and in awarding contracts for con-
struction. 
1.4 CONSTRUCTION PHASE—ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT 
1.4.1 The Construction Phase will commence with the 
award of the Contract for Construction and will terminate 
when final payment to the Contractor is due, or in the 
absence of a final Certificate for Payment or of such due 
date, sixty days after the Date of Substantial Completion 
of the Work, whichever occurs first. 
1.4.2 Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement and 
incorporated in the Contract Documents, the Architect 
shall provide administration of the Contract for Construc-
tion as set forth below and in the edition of AIA Docu-
ment A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Con-
struction, current as of the date of this Agreement. 
1.4.3 The Architect shall be a representative of the 
Owner during the Construction Phase. Instructions to the 
Contractor shall be forwarded through the Architect. 
1.4.4 The Architect shall visit the site at intervals appro-
priate to the stage of construction or as otherwise agreed 
by the Architect in writing to become generally familiar 
with the progress and quality of the Work and to deter-
mine in general if the Work is proceeding in accordance 
with the Contract Documents. However, the Architect 
shall not be required to make exhaustive or continuous 
on-site inspections to check the quality or quantity of the 
Work. On the basis of such on-site observations as an 
architect, the Architect shall keep the Owner informed of 
the progress and quality of the Work, and shall endeavor 
to guard the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the 
Work of the Contractor. 
1.4.5 The Architect shall not have control or charge of 
and shall not be responsible for construction means, 
methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for 
safety precautions and programs in connection with the 
Work, for the acts or omissions of the Contractor, Sub-
contractors or any other persons performing any of the 
Work, or for the failure of any of them to carry out the 
Work in accordance with the Contract Documents. 
1.4.6 The Architect shall at all times have access to the 
Work wherever it is in preparation and progress. 
1.4.7 The Architect shall determine the amounts owing 
to the Contractor based on observations at the site and 
on evaluations of the Contractor's Applications for Pay-
ment, and shall issue Certificates for Payment in such 
amounts. 
1.4.8 The issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall con-
stitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner, 
based on the Architect's observations at the site as pro-
vided in Subparagraph 1.4.4 and on the data comprising 
the Contractor's Application for Payment, that, to the best 
of the Architect's knowledge, information and belief, the 
Work has progressed to the point indicated; the quality of 
the Work is \t\ accordance with the Contract Documents 
(subject to an evaluation of the Work for conformance 
with the Contract Documents upon Substantial Comple-
tion, to the results of any subsequent tests required by or 
performed under the Contract Documents, to minor 
deviations from the Contract Documents correctable prior 
to completion, and to any specific qualifications stated in 
the Certificate for Payment); and that the Contractor is 
entitled to payment in the amount certified. However, the 
issuance of a Certificate for Payment shall not be a repre-
sentation that the Architect has made any examination to 
ascertain how and for what purpose the Contractor has 
used the moneys paid on account of the Contract Sum. 
1.4.9 The Architect shall be the interpreter of the re-
quirements of the Contract Documents and the judge of 
the performance thereunder by both the Owner and 
Contractor, and shall render written decisions on all 
claims, disputes and other matters in question between 
the Owner and the Contractor. In the capacity of inter-
preter and judge, the Architect shall endeavor to secure 
faithful performance by both the Owner and the Con-
tractor, shall not show partiality to either, and shall not be 
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liable for the result of any interpretation or decision 
rendered in good faith in such capacity. 
1.4.10 The Architect shall have authority to reject Work 
which does not conform to the Contract Documents, and 
will have authority to require special inspection or testing 
of the Work whenever, in the Architect's reasonable opin-
ion, it is necessary or advisable for the implementation of 
the intent of the Contract Documents. 
1.4.11 The Architect shall review and approve or take 
other appropriate action upon the Contractor's submittals 
such as Shop Drawings, Product Data and Samples, but 
only for conformance with the design concept of the 
Work and with the information given in the Contract 
Documents. Such action shall be taken with reasonable 
promptness so as to cause no delay. The Architect's ap-
proval of a specific item shall not indicate approval of an 
assembly of which the item is a component. 
1.4.12 The Architect shall prepare Change Orders for the 
Owner's approval and execution, and shall have authority 
to order minor changes in the Work not involving an 
adjustment in the Contract Sum or an extension of the 
Contract Time. 
1.4.13 The Architect shall conduct inspections to deter-
mine the Dates of Substantial Completion and final com-
pletion, and shall issue a final Certificate for Payment. 
1.4.14 The extent of the duties, responsibilities and limita-
tions of authority of the Architect as the Owner's repre-
sentative during construction shall not be modified or ex-
tended without written consent of the Owner, the Con-
tractor and the Architect. 
1.5 ADDITIONAL SERVICES 
1.5.1 Additional Services shall be provided if authorized 
or confirmed in writing by the Owner or if included in 
Article 10, and they shall be paid for by the Owner as 
provided in this Agreement. 
1.5.2 If the Owner and the Architect agree that more 
extensive representation at the site than is described in 
Paragraph 1.4 shall be provided, such additional project 
representation shall be provided and paid for as set forth 
in Article 10. 
1.6 TIME 
1.6.1 The Architect shall perform services as expediti-
ously as is consistent with professional skill and care and 
the orderly progress of the Work. 
ARTICLE 2 
THE OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
The following services and responsibilities, and 
any others so indicated in Article 10, shall be un-
dertaken by the Owner. 
2.1 The Owner shall provide full information including 
a program, which shall set forth the Owner's design 
objectives, constraints and criteria. 
2.2 The Owner shall furnish a legal description and a 
certified land survey of the site and the services of soil 
engineers or other consultants when such services are 
deemed necessary by the Architect. 
2.3 The Owner shall furnish structural, mechanical, 
chemical and other laboratory tests, inspections and re-
ports as required by law or the Contract Documents. 
2.4 The Owner shall furnish ail legal, accounting and 
insurance counseling services as may be necessary at any 
time for the Project, including such auditing services as 
the Owner may require to verify the Contractor's Applica-
tions for Payment or to ascertain how or for what pur-
poses the Contractor uses the moneys paid by the Owner. 
2.5 The services, information, surveys and reports re-
quired by Paragraphs 2.2 through 2.4 inclusive shall be 
furnished at the Owner's expense, and the Architect shall 
be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness 
thereof. 
2.6 If the Owner observes or otherwise becomes aware 
of any fault or defect in the Project or nonconformance 
with the Contract Documents, prompt written notice 
thereof shall be given by the Owner to the Architect. 
2.7 The Owner shall furnish required information and 
shall render approvals and decisions as expeditiously as 
necessary for the orderly progress of the Architect's serv-




3.1.1 The Construction Cost shall be the total cost or 
estimated cost to the Owner of all elements of the Project 
designed or specified by the Architect. 
3.1.2 The Construction Cost shall include at current mar-
ket rates, including a reasonable allowance for overhead 
and profit, the cost of labor and materials furnished by 
the Owner and any equipment which has been designed, 
specified, selected or specially provided for by the Archi-
tect. 
3.1.3 Construction Cost does not include the compensa-
tion of the Architect and the Architect's consultants, the 
cost of the land, rights-of-way, or other costs which are 
the responsibility of the Owner as provided in Article 2. 
3.2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTRUCTION COST 
3.2.1 It is recognized that neither the Architect nor the 
Owner has control over the cost of labor, materials or 
equipment, over the Contractor's methods of determining 
bid prices, or over competitive bidding, market or nego-
tiating conditions. Accordingly, the Architect cannot and 
does not warrant or represent that bids or negotiated 
prices will not vary from any Statement of Probable Con-
struction Cost or other cost estimate or evaluation pre-
pared by the Architect. 
3.2.2 No fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be estab-
lished as a condition of this Agreement by the furnishing, 
proposal or establishment of a Project budget, unless such 
fixed limit has been agreed upon in writing and signed by 
the parties hereto. If such a fixed limit has been estab-
lished, the Architect shall be permitted to include con-
tingencies for design, bidding and price escalation, to de-
termine what materials, equipment, component systems 
and types of construction are to be included in the Con-
tract Documents, to make reasonable adjustments in the 
scope of the Project and to include in the Contract Doc-
uments Alternate Bids to adjust the Construction Cost to 
the fixed limit. Any such fixed limit shall be increased in 
3 B151-1978 AIA DOCUMENT B1S1 • ABBREVIATED OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT • JUNE 1978 EDITION • AIA* © 1978 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C 20006 
the amount of any increase in the Contract Sum occurring 
after execution of the Contract for Construction. 
3.2.3 Any Project budget or fixed limit of Construction 
Cost shall be adjusted to reflect any change in the general 
level of prices in the construction industry between the 
date of submission of the Construction Documents to the 
Owner and the date on which proposals are sought. 
3.2.4 If a fixed limit of Construction Cost (adjusted as 
provided in Subparagraph 3.2.3) is exceeded by the low-
est bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, the Owner shall 
(1) give written approval of an increase in such fixed limit, 
(2) authorize rebidding or renegotiating of the Project 
within a reasonable time, (3) if the Project is abandoned, 
terminate in accordance with Paragraph 7.2, or (4) coop-
erate in revising the Project scope and quality as required 
to reduce the Construction Cost. In the case of (4), pro-
vided a fixed limit of Construction Cost has been estab-
lished as a condition of this Agreement, the Architect, 
without additional charge, shall modify the Drawings and 
Specifications as necessary to comply with the fixed limit. 
The providing of such service shall be the limit of the 
Architect's responsibility arising from the establishment of 
such fixed limit, and having done so, the Architect shall 
be entitled to compensation for all services performed, in 
accordance with this Agreement, whether or not the Con-
struction Phase is commenced. 
ARTICLE 4 
PAYMENTS TO THE ARCHITECT 
4.1 An initial payment as set forth in Paragraph 9.1 is 
the minimum payment under this Agreement. 
4.2 Subsequent payments for Basic Services shall be 
made monthly and shall be in proportion to services per-
formed within each Phase. 
4.3 When compensation is based on a percentage of 
Construction Cost, and any portions of the Project are 
deleted or otherwise not constructed, compensation for 
such portions of the Project shall be payable to the extent 
services are performed on such portions, in accordance 
with the schedule set forth in Subparagraph 9.2.2, based 
on (1) the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, or 
(2) if no such bid or proposal is received, the most recent 
Statement of Probable Construction Cost. 
4.4 Reimbursable Expenses include actual expenditures 
made by the Architect in the interest of the Project for: 
.1 expense of transportation and living expenses in 
connection with out-of-town travel, authorized by 
the Owner, 
.2 long distance communications, 
•3 fees paid for securing approval of authorities hav-
ing jurisdiction over the Project, 
,4 reproductions, 
•5 postage and handling of Drawings and Specifica-
tions, 
.6 renderings and models requested by the Owner, 
.7 expense of overtime work requiring higher than 
regular rates, if authorized by the Owner, 
.8 expense of any additional insurance coverage or 
limits, including professional liability insurance, 
requested by the Owner in excess of that normally 
carried by the Architect and the Architect's con-
sultants. 
4.5 Payments on account of the Architect's Additional 
Services and for Reimbursable Expenses as defined in 
Paragraph 4.4 shall be made monthly upon presentation 
of the Architect's statement of services rendered or ex-
penses incurred. 
4.6 No deductions shall be made from the Architect's 
compensation on account of sums withheld from pay-
ments to contractors. 
4.7 If the Project is suspended or abandoned in whole 
or in part for more than three months, the Architect shall 
be compensated for all services performed prior to receipt 
of written notice from the Owner of such suspension or 
abandonment, together with Reimbursable Expenses then 
due and all Termination Expenses as defined in Paragraph 
7.4. If the Project is resumed after being suspended for 
more than three months, the Architect's compensation 
shall be equitably adjusted. 
ARTICLES 
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF DOCUMENTS 
5.1 Drawings and Specifications as instruments of serv-
ice are and shall remain the property of the Architect 
whether the Project for which they are made is executed 
or not. The Owner shall be permitted to retain copies, in-
cluding reproducible copies, of Drawings and Specifica-
tions for information and reference in connection with 
the Owner's use and occupancy of the Project. The Draw-
ings and Specifications shall not be used by the Owner on 
other projects, for additions to this Project, or for com-
pletion of this Project by others provided the Architect is 
not in default under this Agreement, except by agreement 
in writing and with appropriate compensation to the 
Architect. 
5.2 Submission or distribution to meet official regula-
tory requirements or for other purposes in connection 
with the Project is not to be construed as publication in 
derogation of the Architect's rights. 
ARTICLE 6 
ARBITRATION 
6.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in question 
between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of or 
relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be 
decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construc-
tion Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association then obtaining unless the parties mutu-
ally agree otherwise. No arbitration, arising out of or re-
lating to this Agreement, shall include, by consolidation, 
joinder or in any other manner, any additional person 
not a party to this Agreement except by written consent 
containing a specific reference to this Agreement and 
signed by the Architect, the Owner, and any other person 
sought to be joined. Any consent to arbitration involving 
an additional person or persons shall not constitute con-
sent to arbitration of any dispute not described therein. 
This Agreement to arbitrate and any agreement to arbi-
trate with an additional person or persons duly consented 
to by the parties to this Agreement shall be specifically 
enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law. 
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6.2 In no event shall the demand for arbitration be 
made after the date when institution of legal or equitable 
proceedings based on such claim, dispute or other matter 
in question would be barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
6.3 The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be 
final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance 
with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction 
thereof. 
ARTICLE 7 
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
7.1 This Agreement may be terminated by either party 
upon seven days' written notice should the other party 
fail substantially to perform in accordance with its terms 
through no fault of the party initiating the termination. 
7.2 This Agreement may be terminated by the Owner 
upon at least seven days' written notice to the Architect 
in the event that the Project is permanently abandoned. 
7.3 In the event of termination not the fault of the 
Architect, the Architect shall be compensated for all 
services performed to termination date, together with Re-
imbursable Expenses then due and all Termination Ex-
penses as defined in Paragraph 7.4. 
7.4 Termination Expenses include expenses directly at-
tributable to termination for which the Architect is not 
otherwise compensated, plus an amount computed as a 
percentage of the total compensation earned to the time 
of termination, as follows: 
.1 20 percent if termination occurs during the Design 
Phase, or 
.2 10 percent if termination occurs during the Con-
struction Documents Phase, or 




8.1 This Agreement shall be governed by the law of 
the principal place of business of the Architect. 
8.2 As between the parties to this Agreement: as to all 
acts or failures to act by either party to this Agreement, 
any applicable statute of limitations shall commence to 
run and any alleged cause of action shall be deemed to 
have accrued in any and all events not later than the 
relevant Date of Substantial Completion of the Work, and 
as to any acts or failures to act occurring after the relevant 
Date of Substantial Completion, not later than the date of 
issuance of the final Certificate for Payment. 
8.3 The Owner and the Architect, respectively, bind 
themselves, their partners, successors, assigns and legal 
representatives to the other party to this Agreement and 
to the partners, successors, assigns and legal representa-
tives of such party with respect to all covenants of this 
Agreement. Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall 
assign, sublet or transfer any interest in this Agreement 
without the written consent of the other. 
8.4 This Agreement represents the entire and inte-
grated agreement between the Owner and the Architect 
and supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or 
agreements, either written or oral. This Agreement may be 
amended only by written instrument signed by both 
Owner and Architect. 
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